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INTRODUCTION

This note focuses on court decisions concerning the extraterritorial reach
of the Lanham Act' (Act). The Act does not expressly establish the limits
of its jurisdiction beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States.2
* This note is written in memory of Robert Butts, Sr. and dedicated to Katharine Ingle
for her encouragement. I am also grateful to my wife Susan and my daughters Lauren and
Stephanie, for their patience and support.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 - 1127 (1988).
2. Vanity Fair Mills v. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 642 (2d Cir. 1956).
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Therefore, its extraterritorial scope has been defined primarily by judicial
decisions.3
Two distinctive tests have emerged to interpret the congressional intent
of the Act's extraterritorial application. The Second Circuit bases its
translation primarily on the tripartite test.4 The test involves a rigid inquiry
using three factors to determine whether American interests are strong
enough to justify an extraterritorial assertion ofjurisdiction. Variations of the
tripartite test are also used in the Fourth and Fifth Circuits. In contrast, the
Ninth Circuit uses a more flexible jurisdictional rule of reason test in which
it balances all relevant factors in making its decision.'
This note analyzes the evolution and various applications of both
extraterritorial tests as they are used by district and circuit courts to
determine the reach of the Act. Specifically, the note is divided into four
separate discussions of how the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits
determine the extraterritorial reach of the Act. These are the circuits that are
the most active in this area of the law. The structure of the note moves
forward chronologically within each circuit by analyzing the major cases and
how the law has evolved to its position today. Finally, each position is
evaluated and a model is recommended that may inject some predictability
and uniformity into this area of the law.
The relevant issue involves a jurisdictional inquiry. However, the term
"jurisdiction" as utilized in decisions involving the Act, has led to some
confusion. Therefore, this note opens by clarifying the term "jurisdiction"
as it is used in the context of the cases discussed.
II.

JURISDICTION

Congress decreed the Act to protect American consumers from confusion
concerning the manufacturing origin of products. 6 Its additional purpose was
to protect holders of American trademarks against misappropriation of their
marks.7 The Act provides that any person using a registered trademark in
commerce without authorization is subject to liability when the use is likely
to cause confusion.' Commerce is defined as all commerce which may
3. See Andrew Cogdell, Note, ExtraterritorialApplication of the Lanham Act: American
Rice, Inc. v. Arkansas Rice Growers Coop. Ass'n., 9 N.C.J. INT'L L. 133 (1983).
4. Vanity Fair,234 F.2d at 642.
5. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976).
As a point of clarification, this test is also referred to in cases as the Timberlane test which
is how it is referred to in this note.
6. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d 733, 746 (2d Cir. 1994).
7. Id.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 11 14(l)(a)(b) (1988).
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant,

(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol8/iss3/7
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lawfully be regulated by Congress. 9 The United States district courts are
granted original jurisdiction over all actions arising under the Act.'" Some
courts improperly characterize the extraterritorial tests, which follow, as being
vehicles used to determine subject matter jurisdiction."
This creates
confusion because subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by the Act itself
over all actions arising under the Act.' 2 " ,: .
Congress intended to occupy the field with respect to claims arising from
trademark infringement to the extent of Federal power under the Commerce
Clause. 13 Commerce with foreign nations and among the several states is
expressly included in the Commerce Clause.' 4 Therefore, it seems anomalous that Congress would have authorized the Act to extend to foreign
governments and not to foreign citizens and corporations. 5 Furthermore,
the power to regulate the conduct of American citizens abroad is inherent in
national sovereignty. 6 Therefore, Congress intended to extend the Act to
the limits of the authority delegated by the constitution"' as expressed by
the Act's language, "all commerce within the control of Congress"."
Consequently, even foreigners may be liable for acts done abroad which
cause damage within the territorial limits of the United States.' 9
As a result, the issue 'is not whether congress has subject matter
jurisdiction over extraterritorial trademark actions. Instead, it is. whether

of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution
or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such
use is likely to cause confusion; or
(b) copy a registered mark ... in connection with which such use is likely
to cause confusion ... shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant .
Id.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1121 (1988) provides: "The district and territorial courts ... shall have
original jurisdiction and the courts of appeal ... shall have appellate jurisdiction of all actions
arising under this chapter without regard to the amount in controversy or to diversity ......
11. Zenger-Miller v. Training Team, 757 F.Supp. 1062, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1121 (1988). See also Industrial Development Corp. v. Mitsui & Co.,
671 F.2d 876, 884 (5th Cir. 1982).
13. Ramirez & Feraud Chili v. Las Palmas Food, 146 F.Supp. 594, 601 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
Congress intended to extend the reach of the Act to the limits of its constitutionally delegated
authority. Id.
14. Id.
15. James W. Dabney, Trademarks, Unfair Competition, and Copyrights: Recent
Developments and Other Important Issues on the ExtraterritorialReach of the Lanham Act.
C790 ALI-ABA 183, 197 (1992).
16. Ramirez, 146 F.Supp. at 600. The power to regulate the conduct of American conduct
abroad is based on the allegiance owed to the United States by each of its citizens. Id.
17. Id.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988).
19. Ramirez, 146 F.Supp. at 601.
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Congress intended to extend its power to a particular factual situation.2 °
The answer to this inquiry depends on whether the affected commerce is
commerce that is within the control of Congress." This note analyzes and
compares the extraterritorial tests that are employed by federal courts in
making this determination.
III.

INTERPRETING THE CONGRESSIONAL INTENT

A.

The Supreme Court

In Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., Bulova sued Steele for trademark
infringement under the Act.22 The defendant was an American citizen who
purchased watch parts in the United States and had them assembled in
Mexico.23 In the manufacturing process the watches were imprinted with
plaintiff's American trademark. 24 Defendant had registered a trademark in
Mexico that was identical to Bulova's American mark. 25 However,
subsequent to the decision of the circuit and prior to the decision of the
Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Mexico nullified defendant's
registration. 26 The Bulova Court noted that Congressional legislation was
not intended to extend beyond the boundaries of the United States unless a
contrary legislative intent appeared in the statute.27 As a result, the question
was whether Congress intended the Act to apply to the instant facts. 28 The
Court noted that no international law prevented the United States from
governing the conduct of its citizens in foreign countries. 29 Furthermore,
the jurisdictional scope of the Act broadly reaches all commerce lawfully
3
regulated by Congress.
As a result, the Court made several findings. First, it reasoned that the
effects of defendant's conduct were not confined to Mexico. 3' Defendant's
scheme adversely affected Bulova's trade reputation in markets cultivated
both domestically and abroad 2 Furthermore, spurious Bulova watches
filtered back into the United States from Mexico and impacted the sale of
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285 (1952).
Id. at 287.
Id. at 285.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

29. Id. See also Luft v. Zande Cosmetic, 142 F.2d 536 (2d Cir. 1944) for an example of
the extraterritorial reasoning used prior to the Act.
30. Bulova, 344 U.S. at 286.
31. Id. at 286.
32. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol8/iss3/7
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legitimate Bulova's.
In addition, defendant purchased some of the parts for the infringing
watches in the United States.34 Even though these purchases were legal,
they were essential steps in the illegal manufacturing process.35 Acts that
are legal in themselves, lose that character upon becoming part of an illegal
scheme.36 It is immaterial whether the source of the unlawful effect on
commerce arises in one phase or another of the manufacturing process.37
Therefore, the Court concluded that the result of defendant's own
deliberate acts, both in the United States and in Mexico, brought about
unlawful results within this country. 38 As a result, the Bulova Court held
that Congress intended the Act to reach defendant's conduct. 39 Consequently, the circuit court was correct in exercising its. powers of equity and
awarding plaintiff injunctive relief against defendant's infringing Mexican
4
activity.
Bulova has special significance because it represents the only Supreme
Court interpretation to date of the Act's extraterritorial reach. As a result,
Bulova and the Act comprise the foundation on which all subsequent
extraterritorial reasoning is based. From Bulova, several important concepts
emerged.
Bulova clearly held that Congress intended the Act to reach certain
trademark infringements even when the infringement occurs completely
outside the United States. 41 However, Bulova's extraterritorial reach is
qualified somewhat by three elements on which the Court rested its decision.
First, the Court was concerned with finding some degree of effect on
American commerce. 42 This represented a liberalization of the place-of-thetort-test which had been a critical determinant of extraterritorial jurisdiction
prior to the Act.43 Thus, the inquiry was shifted from the place where the
illegal act occurred to where its effect was felt.44
Next, the conduct which the Court enjoined was that of an American

33. Id.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id..
Id.
Id.at 287.
Id.
Id. at 288.
Id..

40. Id.
41. Id. at 285.
42. Id. at 286.

43. See Vacuum Oil Co. v. Eagle Oil Co., 122 F. 105, 106 (C.C.D.N.J. 1903); see also
Thomas Berner, ExtraterritorialApplication of the Lanham Act:

Wells Fargo and Co. v.

Wells'Fargo Express Co., 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 173, 175-179 (1980) for a historical
perspective of the place-of-the-tort test, also known as lex loci delecti.
44. Bemer, supra note 43, at 181.
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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citizen.45 The Court reasoned that this was merely an application of
American law which established the duty of American citizens to their own
government.46 Finally, the Bulova Court held that its decision did not
conflict with Mexican sovereignty since the defendant's Mexican Bulova
trademark was no longer valid.47 Therefore, the Court noted in dicta that
it did not need to address the question of how the presence of a valid foreign
trademark may have affected its decision.48 These three factors represent
the cornerstone on which subsequent courts developed the tripartite test.
B.
1.

The Second Circuit

49
Vanity FairMills v. Eaton Co.

In Vanity, the plaintiff was an American corporation holding a valid
American trademark, conducting business in both Canada and the United
States.5" The defendant was a Canadian corporation holding a valid
Canadian trademark which was identical to plaintiff's American mark.5
The Vanity court addressed the issue of whether Congress intended the Act
to apply to conduct occurring outside the United States by interpreting
Bulova 's reasoning.52 This resulted in the development of the tripartite
test."
In its analysis, the Second Circuit noted that Congress had no power to
regulate commerce "in" Canada. 54 However, it could regulate commerce
"with" Canada." The Vanity court recognized this power as extending even
to entirely foreign commerce, providing that the effect on commerce between
the United States and Canada was substantial.5 6 As a result, the requirement
of a substantial
effect on American commerce became the first element of the
57
tripartite test.

However, the Bulova Court did not use language that required a
substantial in order to apply the Act extraterritorially. In Bulova, the Court

45. Bulova, 344 U.S. at 281.
46. Id. at 285.
47. Id. at 288. See also Leonel Pereznieto Castro, Resolution of an International
Transaction Under Mexican Conflict of Laws Principles,7 FLA. J. INT'L L. 427 (1992) for a
discussion of Mexican conflict of laws policy.
48. Bulova, 344 U.S. at 288.
49. 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956).
50. Id. at 637.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 642.
53. Id. at 642.
54. Id. at 641.
55. Id.
56. Id.at 642.
57. Id.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol8/iss3/7
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only noted that the effect on American commerce was adverse.5 8 The
*Bulova Court did not discuss a particular degree of effect that was necessary
in order to extend the reach of the act to infringements occurring in foreign
countries. Furthermore, the Vanity discussion of substantial effect was really
just dicta because the court noted that the inquiry was not even necessary in
reaching its decision. 9
Instead the Vanity court based its decision on what it refers to as the
second and third elements of the tripartite test. As the second element,
Vanity interpreted Bulova as requiring the defendant to be an American
citizen before the Act applied.6' This element is based on Bulova 's notation
that the United States is not prevented from governing the conduct of its
citizens in foreign countries. 6' However, the Bulova Court qualified this
statement by indicating that application of the Act could not infringe on the
rights of foreign nationals or other nations.62 Vanity based its third element
on this qualification by holding that the Act did not reach infringing conduct
when its application conflicted with valid foreign trademark rights.63
In reaching its conclusion, the Vanity court noted that the defendant's
conduct did have a substantial effect on American commerce. 64 However,
it also noted that the defendant was a Canadian citizen. Furthermore,
application of the Act would have conflicted with Canadian trademark law
because the defendant was operating under a valid Canadian trademark, in
Canada.65 Consequently, the plaintiff was only able to establish the first
element of the tripartite test. 66 In evaluating this, the Vanity court held that
the absence of one factor could prevent the Act from reaching foreign
conduct. 67 However, the absence of two factors was definitely determinative.6' Therefore, the Second
Circuit concluded that the Act did not reach
69
conduct.
defendant's
the

58. Bulova, 344 U.S. at 286.
59. Vanity, 234 F.2d at 642-643.
60. Id. at 642.
61. Bulova, 344 U.S. at 285.
62. Id. at 288.
63. Vanity, 234 F.2d at 642.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 643. See also Joost Blom, An International Transaction 'in the Canadian
Conflict of Laws, 7 FLA. J. INT'L L. 403 (1992) for a general discussion of Canadian conflict
of laws.
66. Vanity, 234 F.2d at 643.
67. Id.

68. Id.
69. Id.
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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2.

Olympia
C-Cure Chemical Co. v. Secure Adhesives,
70
Tile
Wall
&
Floor

In C-Cure, one of the defendants, Olympia, was a Canadian corporation
engaged in the sale of ceramic tile and related products. 7 Among the
products Olympia sold was an adhesive which Olympia purchased from the
other defendant, Secure Adhesives.72 Secure Adhesives was an American
corporation whose sole stockholder was also Olympia's vice-president.73
The plaintiff, C-Cure, was an American corporation that was also engaged
in the distribution of tile adhesive. 74 C-Cure's product was marketed and
sold under the registered American trademark, "C-Cure."75 C-Cure sought
relief from both Secure and Olympia for trademark infringement.76 The
Second Circuit found for Secure because C-Cure was unable to show that
consumers were likely to be confused as to the origin of the product by
Secure's trade dress.77 However, the critical extraterritorial issue before the
court was whether it had the power under the Act to enjoin Olympia, as
well.78
In examining the effect of Olympia's conduct on commerce in the United
States, the court noted that Olympia had loaned the funds to establish Secure
Adhesives. 79 Further, Olympia presently purchased adhesives from Secure
with the infringing "Secure" labels.8 0 Finally, Secure presently purchased
its chemical concentrates from a Canadian company whose stock was owned
entirely by Olympia."' Consequently, the C-Cure court found the foregoing
facts to illustrate that Olympia's business activity had a substantial effect on
American Commerce. 2
There was no debate concerning the second element of the tripartite test

70. 571 F. Supp. 808 (W.D.N.Y. 1983).
71. Id. at 812.
72. Id.

73. Id. at 811.
74. ld. at 810.
75. Id. at 813.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 820.
78. Id. Prior to this court action, the Divisional Court of the Supreme Court of Ontario
held that C-Cure had failed to persuade the court that a temporary injunction should be
awarded. Id. at 813. At the time of this case, C-Cure's Canadian appeal was pending. Id.
However, when trademark rights are being litigated in an American court, the decisions of
foreign courts on the same subject are irrelevant and inadmissible. Id.
79. Id. at 821.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol8/iss3/7
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because Olympia was not an American company.8 3 However, the C-Cure
court did consider the third factor in which it had to determine whether an
injunction or a damage award against Olympia would conflict with Canadian
law.8 In consideration of the third tripartite element, the court noted that
Olympia had successfully defended its use of the trademark "Secure
Adhesives" in Canada."
Consequently, enjoining shipments of Secure
86
Adhesives to Olympia would likely conflict with Canadian trademark law.
As a result, C-Cure was unsuccessful in establishing any of the tripartite
elements, hence the court granted Olympia's motion to dismiss.87
The significance of the court's analysis of the first element of the
tripartite test is that the effects referred to by the court as being substantial
were generally indirect.8 8 C-Cure had virtually no Canadian distribution of
89
its products and Olympia sold none of its products in the United States.
Consequently, there was no direct competition between the two companies
in either country. Hence, the C-Cure decision broadened the scope of
business activities that could be considered in determining whether foreign
conduct had a substantial effect on American commerce. 90 Finally, the
court's analysis of the third tripartite factor affirms the Vanity position
whereby the Act does not reach a foreign citizen acting under a valid foreign
mark in their own country.9 1
3. Calvin Klein Industries v. BFK Hong Kong, Ltd.92
In Klein, plaintiff Calvin Klein sought to enjoin defendant BFK from
selling apparel overseas bearing plaintiff's valid-American trademark.9 3 In
examining whether BFK's conduct had a substantial effect on American
commerce, the court ruled that diversion of sales from an American company
constituted a substantial effect. 94 The court even expanded this concept to
include sales diverted from foreign licensees of an American company.95

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
86. C-Cure, 571 F. Supp. at 821.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 812.
90. Id.at 821. Compare C-Cure, 571 F. Supp. at 828 with discussion supra part II. and
part III.A.
91. Id.

92. 714 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
93. Id. at 78-79.
94. Id. at 80.
95. Id. The Klein court discussed the concept of an American company having presence
in a foreign country through advertising or foreign licensees. Id. Consequently, American
commerce could be affected without the actual conduct ever reaching the American border.
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96
The Klein court also addressed the citizenship requirement of the test.
In its reasoning the court held that even a foreign citizen who controlled an
American corporation was considered an American citizen for the purposes
of the Act.97 Finally, BFK possessed no foreign rights to Klein's mark. 98
Therefore, there could be no conflict with any foreign laws. 99 Hence, on
the strength of the presence of all three factors, the Klein court enjoined BFK
and its controller from selling infringing goods domestically and abroad.0 0
Klein 's application of the tripartite test is more liberal than the Second
Circuit's application in Vanity. The implication of the diverted sales
argument is that the reach of the Act could conceivably extend worldwide
when an American company has an international presence. Consequently,
while the degree..of effect on commerce must still be substantial,' 0 ' an
international plaintiff has more options with which to satisfy the requirement.
Klein also introduces the concept of constructive citizenship'0 2 which
extends the reach of the Act by making it easier for plaintiffs to satisfy the
citizenship element of the test. As a result, the Klein decision can be seen
as a positive step forward for a plaintiff with a strong international presence.

03

4. Sterling Drug v. Bayer AG'

In Sterling, an American plaintiff, Sterling, sought to enjoin the foreign
defendant, Bayer, from the use of Sterling's registered mark.'14 Bayer held
valid registrations of marks similar to Sterling's in countries outside of the
06
United States. 0 5 Both companies competed domestically and abroad.'
The district court granted an injunction over all of Bayer's domestic and
foreign use of Sterling's mark. 0 7 However, the district court did not
support its extraterritorial analysis by either analyzing the tripartite elements
or eschewing them as inapplicable to this case.'
Bayer appealed the
extraterritorial component of the injunction to the Second Circuit.'0 9
The Second Circuit distinguished the facts of this case from its previous

Id.
96.
97.
98.
99.

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 97.
14 F.3d 733 (2d Cir. 1994).
Id. at 736.

105. Id. at 744.

106. Id. at 738-39.

107. Id. at 739.
108. Id. at 746.
109. Id. at 739. This action came before the Second Circuit on interlocutory appeal. Id.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol8/iss3/7
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decisions regarding the extraterritorial reach of the Act." The court noted
that Sterling sought to enjoin only those foreign uses of Sterling's mark that
were likely to cause confusion among American consumers."' As a result,
the court held that a mechanical application of the tripartite test would result
in a finding of no jurisdiction under the Act." 2 Therefore, the Act's goals
of protecting American consumers against confusion and protecting Sterling
from misappropriation of its mark may fail to be preserved under these
facts."

13

The court reasoned that Congress did not intend the Act to be used as a
sword to completely eviscerate a foreign corporation's foreign trademark.'
Instead it was intended to be used as a shield against foreign uses that
Consequently, Vanity's
substantially affected American commerce."15
application of the tripartite test was too. stringent where the plaintiff sought
merely to limit foreign trademark uses that reached the United States." 6
Hence, the Second Circuit remanded the case for the district court to modify
not reach beyond Bayer's foreign uses that affected
the injunction so it would
7
American commerce."
The Sterling decision provides further insight into the Second Circuit's
interpretation of the extraterritorial applicability of the Act. It is interesting
to note that the court did not discuss why the instant facts would fail a
mechanical application of the tripartite test." 8 Nevertheless, for it to have
applied the Act and remanded for a modified injunction, the court must have
found a substantial effect on American commerce. In addition, it also must
have considered Bayer to be an American citizen. However, since Bayer
held a valid foreign mark, any restriction on the foreign use of the mark
would conflict with the laws of that foreign country."9
Consequently, the decision could be read as ruling that a conflict with
foreign sovereignty alone is not dispositive against the foreign application of
the Act. 20 Alternatively, the decision also can be read that the tripartite

110. Id. at 746.
1ll. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 747.
118. Id. at 746. The Sterling court disposed of the issue in one sentence stating that if the
Act were strictly applied, its application would be forbidden under the facts of this case. Id.
119. Id. at 746.
120. This reasoning is based on the fact that while the court held that a blanket injunction
was too broad, it did not refrain from remanding for a more selective injunction. Id. at 747.
However, even a selective injunction would still conflict with foreign trademark law to some
degree. Consequently, although there was conflict, the implication of the court's decision is
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test is only applicable when a blanket prohibition of a defendant's use of a
plaintiff's mark is sought. When only a partial use is sought, the court
would merely consider whether the foreign uses of the mark had a substantial
effect on American commerce. As a result, the other two tripartite elements
would not be considered,' 2' and only foreign uses that had a substantial
effect on American commerce would be enjoined. In either Case, the
extend
decision establishes the perimeter of the Act's reach in that it does not
122
commerce.
American
affect
not
do
that
acts
commercial
to foreign
5.

Totalplan Corp. of America v. Colborne 123

In Totalplan, American plaintiff Totalplan purchased cameras from
Canadian defendant Colborne, as part of an ongoing business arrangement. 124 Totalplan specified that the cameras were to bear its registered
American trademark, "Love," on the face plate of each camera Totalplan
purchased.12' The cameras were marketed and distributed under the Love
trademark. 126 Totalplan alleged that defendant misappropriated its registered mark by selling Love cameras in Japan and has hence sought
damages. 27 The Totalplan court applied the28tripartite test to determine
whether the Act reached the facts of the case.
In examining whether defendant's sale of cameras had a substantial effect
on American commerce, the court made several findings. First, it noted that
there was no evidence that any of the cameras sold by defendant in Japan
made their way back to the United States and caused confusion among
American consumers.2 9 The court also noted no evidence that any of
Totalplan's foreign sales were diverted by defendant's Japanese sales. 30
In fact, the only cameras that were even shipped to Japan on behalf of
Totalplan did not have the Love mark.' 3 ' As a result, Totalplan was unable
to establish that defendant's conduct had a substantial effect on American

that it applied the Act based on the satisfaction of the other two elements.
121. Id. at 747. But see Nicholas B. Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse:
Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in Interstate and International Law, 65 YALE L.J. 1087,
1150 (1956) (arguing that the effect on American commerce is not, by itself, sufficient
information on which to base a decision that the United States is the nation primarily
interested in the activity causing the effect).
'122. Sterling, 14 F.2d at 747.
123. 14 F.3d 824 (2d Cir. 1994).
124. Id. at 826.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 829.
128. Id. at 830.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 830-31.
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Commerce. 32
The Second Circuit also held that defendant was not an American citizen,
but the court offered no reasoning in support of this assertion. 33 This
seems to contradict the concept of constructive citizenship as discussed in
Klein. 134 Although the defendant in this case was a Canadian corporation,
it owned a manufacturing facility in California. 35 The implication of this
is that the Second Circuit does not agree with the district court's reasoning
and does not recognize. constructive citizenship.
The Totalplan court ruled that since Totalplan was unable to satisfy two
of the tripartite factors, the Act did not apply extraterritorially to these
facts.' 36 As a result, the court did not address the question of whether there
was any conflict with foreign trademark rights. 37 The significance of
Totalplan is that the Second Circuit continues its adherence to a strict
application of the tripartite test. Furthermore, it continues to maintain its
position that the absence of two tripartite elements is fatal to the plaintiff. 3' Finally, it is also notable that the Second Circuit is less likely to
liberalize the tripartite factors as have some of its district courts.' 39
6. Warnaco, Inc. v. VF Corp.140
In Warnaco, plaintiff Wamaco was an American corporation that held a
valid American trademark, "Warner," which it used throughout the
world. 4 ' Defendant Vivesa was a foreign corporation that was licensed to
sell Wamaco's Warner brand apparel. 42 Defendant VF was an American
corporation that competed with Warnaco worldwide. 143 VF acquired
Vivesa and entered into a termination agreement with Warnaco establishing
the process of closing out the license VF had acquired from Vivesa in the
purchase.'" Warnaco alleged that VF marketed Vivesa's inventory of
Warner apparel in such a way that it eroded the value and goodwill of the

132. Id. at 831.
133. Id. at 830.
134. See discussion supra part III.B.3.
135. Id. at 826.
136. Id. at 831.
137. Id. at 831.
138. Id. at 831.
139. See discussion supra part 1II.B.3. and infra part III.B.6.
140. 844 F. Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
141. Id. at 943.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 944.
144. Id. at 944. The termination agreement required VF to use their best efforts to
maximize the promotion of Warner products through the end of 1993. Id.
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145

Warner trademark.
The question before the Warnaco court was whether Congress intended
the Act to reach VF's conduct.1 46 The court employed the tripartite test in
its analysis.'47 However, it referred to its analysis as a balancing of the
tripartite factors to see if the interests of the United States were sufficient to
extend the reach of the Act.1 48 In examining the effect of VF's conduct on
American commerce, the court held that a substantial effect can arise from
harm to a plaintiff's reputation.' 49 Warnaco had the exclusive right to its
name throughout the world because of its worldwide advertising and use of
foreign licensees. 50 Therefore, the court concluded that VF's activity had
affected Warnaco's reputation in Europe and therefore affected American
commerce as well. 51
The Wamaco court disposed of the second tripartite factor because VF
was an American corporation.' 52 In addition, there was no question of
conflict with any foreign trademark laws because Wamaco held the foreign
rights to its mark.'53 As a result, the court balanced all three factors and
concluded that American interests were sufficient to apply the Act in this

case. 154
The Warnaco court's use of the language that it "balanced" the factors
of the tripartite test is interesting and unique among courts of the Second
Circuit. Balancing suggests that the individual factors may have different
weights. The court does not discuss the relative weights, but the implication
is that a lot of one may offset less or none of another. This is in contrast to
the Second Circuit's concept in Totalplan and Vanity where the absence of
two of the tripartite factors was certainly fatal to a plaintiff's case. 55 The
Warnaco reasoning is actually closer to that of Fifth Circuit.

145. Id. at 944-945. Warnaco alleged that VF dumped Warner products on the market at.
distressed prices that created questions among consumers concerning the integrity of Warner
products. Id.
146. Id. at 950.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 950-951.
150. Id. at 951.
151. Id. at 952.
152. Id. at 952. VF was an American corporation and Vivesa was its wholly owned
subsidiary.
153. Id.
154. Id. In addition to the tripartite factors, the court also considered the interests in a
speedy and complete disposition of the dispute. Id.

155. See discussion supra part III.B.I., 5.
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. C.

The Fifth Circuit

In American Rice v. Arkansas Rice Growers Cooperative Ass 'n, 56 both
the plaintiff and defendant were American corporations marketing their rice
in Saudi Arabia.'57 Plaintiff marketed its product under its valid American
trademark. 58 Neither party held a Saudi Arabian mark. 5 9 Plaintiff
alleged that defendant's trade dress was too similar to plaintiff's and was
therefore confusing to Saudi Arabian consumers as to the origin of the
product. 60
In its analysis of the Act's applicability to these facts, the court
employed
the tripartite test.' 6' However,'the Rice court utilized the tripartite factors
primarily as elements in a balancing analysis. 62 Moreover, it did not limit
its inquiry exclusively to those factors, but instead, all relevant considerations
were evaluated in reaching its decision.' 63 The court reasoned that Congress can prevent unfair trade practices in foreign commerce by American
citizens, even when the acts occur outside American borders. 1"4 Therefore,
the Rice, court did not hold the absence
of one factor to be dispositive of a
65
lack of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the court ruled that the degree of effect on United States
commerce need not be "substantial" as long as there was merely "some"
effect."6 The court noted that the origins of the substantiality test lie in the
Supreme Court's effort to distinguish between intrastate and interstate
commerce. 67 Congress may not regulate "intrastate" commerce, but it can
68
control "interstate" commerce.1
Consequently, the court recognized that the substantial effect requirement

156. 701 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1983).
157. Id. at 410.

158. Id.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 411.
Id. at 412.
Id. at 414.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 416.
Id. at 414.
Id. at 414 n.8

167. Id. See also Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 612. The court noted that the substantial effect
requirement may have evolved from interstate antitrust laws. Id. However, the context of
antitrust does not involve all the factors that are relevant to foreign trade. Id. Therefore, a
substantial effect is an important criteria when dealing with antitrust cases. Id. However, it
does not apply to foreign trademark law because no comparable constitutional problem exists
in defining the scope of congressional power to regulate foreign trade. Id. Consequently, the
court held that it may be unwise to blindly apply the substantiality test to the international
setting. Id.
168. Id.
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was unnecessary in the area of foreign commerce where Congress already has
exclusive authority.1 69 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit considered both foreign
and domestic interests in determining whether those interests were sufficient
to support foreign application of the Act. 70 As a result, the Rice court
eschewed the rigid application of the tripartite test in its decision and
concluded that the Act extended to the facts of the case.' 7' Consequently,
the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the Act's extraterritorial reach effectively
exceeded that of the Second Circuit.
D.

The Ninth Circuit

1. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co.'72
In Wells Fargo, the plaintiff Wells Fargo was an American corporation
doing business worldwide.'73 It made use of the trademark "Wells Fargo"
which was registered in the United States and in various foreign countries.'74 The defendants were AG which was a foreign corporation, and
Express which was one of AG's American subsidiaries.'75 Wells Fargo
alleged that AG attempted to appropriate the "Wells Fargo" name in both
Europe and the United States. 7 6 The relevant issue was whether the reach
of the Act could be extended to AG's foreign conduct.'77
The Ninth Circuit eschewed the tripartite test in favor of a more flexible
jurisdictional rule of reason analysis.' 78 Therefore, the Wells Fargo court
adopted a test that was set out. in Timberlane179 to govern the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act. 80 The Timberlane test first asks whether
8
the defendant's conduct has some effect on American commerce.' '
Second, the effect must be sufficiently great to present a cognizable injury

169. Id. The court found that some effect on commerce was sufficient to find jurisdiction
under the Act. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 417-18.
172. 556 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1977).
173. Id. at 411.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 412, 427.
178. Id. at 427.
179. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613.
180. Wells Fargo, 556 F.2d at 427. See also Andrew Cogdell, Note, Extraterritorial
Application of the Lanham Act: American Rice, Inc. v. Arkansas Rice Growers Coop. Ass "n,
9 N.C.J. INT'L L. 133, 140 (1983).
181. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613. See also Dane K. Rutledge, Comment, Sherman Act
Litigation: A Modern Generic Approach to Objective TerritorialJurisdiction and the Act of
State Doctrine, 84 DICK. L. REV. 645, 658 (1980).
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to plaintiffs claiming under the Act.' 8 2 However, beyond that the effect
does not have to be substantial.18 3 Finally, the interests of American
foreign commerce must be sufficiently strong in relation to those of other
4
This third
nations, to justify an assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction.'
85
factors.
several
of
requirement involved the balancing
The Wells Fargo district court employed a strict application of the
tripartite test in reaching its conclusion that the Act did not reach AG's
foreign activity.8 6 However, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case back to
the district court to apply the Timberlane test instead.8 7 The significance
of Wells Fargois that it established the Timberlane test as the standard of the
ninth circuit determining the extraterritorial reach of the Act. Thus, the Wells
Fargo decision represented a significant departure from the tripartite test as
employed by the Second Circuit.
2.

Reebok Internationalv. Marantech Enterprises'

The Reebok court applied the limberlane factors just as it had in the
other extraterritorial Lanham Act cases since Wells Fargo. 89 In Reebok,
plaintiff manufactured and sold shoes under its registered American
trademark, "Reebok."' 90 Reebok alleged that defendant Betech sold
counterfeit Reebok shoes in Mexico and that these sales detracted from
legitimate sales of Reeboks both in Mexico and the United States.' 9 ' The
district court agreed with Reebok and issued a preliminary injunction
ordering Betech to cease the counterfeiting activity.' 92 Betech appealed,
questioning the district court's authority to enjoin its extraterritorial

182. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613.
183. Id.

Id.
185. Id. at 614. The court considered the following factors in its balancing analysis: (1)
the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, (2) the nationality or allegiance of the parties
and their principle places of business, (3) the extent to which enforcement by either state can
be expected to achieve compliance, (4) the relative significance of effects on the United States
as compared with those elsewhere, (5) the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm
or affect American commerce, (6) the foreseeability of such effect, and (7) the relative
importance to the violations charged of conduct within the United States as compared with
conduct abroad. Id. at 614.
184.

186. Wells Fargo, 556 F.2d at 427.

187. Id. at 429.
188. 970 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1992).
189. Id. at 554. See also Ocean Garden v. Marktrade Co., 953 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1991);
Star-Kist Foods v. Rhodes & Co., 769 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1985).
190. Reebok, 970 F.2d at 554.
191. Id.

192. Id.
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93

conduct.1
The Reebok court quickly disposed of the first two imberlane
requirements.' 9 4 Reebok's loss of sales to Betech's scheme affected
American foreign commerce in a manner that caused injury to Reebok and
was thus, cognizable under the Act.' 9 In addressing the third Timberlane
element, the court weighed the seven balancing factors.' 96
First, the Reebok court examined the degree of conflict with Mexican
law. ' Reebok's trademark was registered in Mexico and Betech had no
Mexican mark.' 9 Consequently, the court held that the first factor did not
weigh against the extraterritorial application of the Act. 9
The second factor required the court to examine the nationality of the
parties and their principle places of business.2"'
One of the Reebok
plaintiffs was an American citizen and the other was a British company with
substantial contacts with the United States.20' Betech was a Mexican
citizen, but he resided in the United States.20 2 Furthermore, his company
was incorporated in California and San Diego was its primary place of business.20 3 Thus, the second factor weighed in favor of application. 2"
Third, the Reebok court considered the extent to which enforcement by
either the United States or Mexico could be expected to achieve compliance. 205 Because the sale of the infringing shoes took place in Mexico, it
was possible that Mexico could enforce either its own, or American
trademark laws.2"6 However, American enforcement would have more
influence over Betech because his principal place of business as well as the
majority of his assets were in America. 20 7 Furthermore, most of Betech's
Mexican activities occurred in border towns and was directed at American
208
consumers.
Fourth, the court looked into the relative significance of the effects of
Betech's activity on the United States as compared with the effects on

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 555.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 556.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 557.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Mexico. 20 9 The potential for diverted sales was more likely in California
210
than in Mexico because of the larger American market for the product.
Consequently, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that it was more likely that the
degree of harm from Betech's activity would be greater in America than in
Mexico.21
The Reebok court quickly decided that Betech satisfied the fifth factor of
having an explicit purpose to negatively affect American commerce.' 12 His
efforts directly targeted American consumers, and virtually all of his sales
were made in Mexican border towns to Americans.1 The sixth factor was
a consideration of whether Betech could have foreseen the negative effect on
American commerce that would -have resulted from his counterfeiting
activity."' The court simply held that the foreseeability that most of the
consumers for Betech's product would be Americans, was undeniable. 15
The final factor evaluated by the court was whether Betech's actions in
America were more or less significant to Reebok's claim than his actions in
Mexico. 216 It was likely that most, if not all of the counterfeit sales were
made in Mexico217 However, Betech ran his business from California.
Reebok's trademark infringement claim was based on actions occurring in
both countries. 28 The court ruled that the seventh factor was inconclusive.2t 9
The Reebok court concluded that six of the seven factors evaluated
weighed in favor of exercising jurisdiction. 220 Furthermore, the weight of
the factors was sufficient to outweigh any possible counterbalancing factors
that were not considered. 2 ' As a: result of this, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the district court had not abused its discretion by enjoining
22
Betech's counterfeiting activity.
The Reebok, decision is an illustration of how the Timberlane test is
applied. The test is probably best understood by looking at it as having three
elements. 23 The first two of which are really two parts of the same

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613.
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question which establishes the degree that defendant's conduct affects
American commerce.224 The third "element" is then evaluated by balancing
the seven enumerated "factors. 225 A court evaluating these factors should
identify the potential degree of conflict if American authority is asserted.226
In doing so, it may be necessary to consider other relevant factors that might
counter the result reached after balancing the seven.22 7 This requires a
court to compare the weight of the seven factors to the potential weight of
the anticipated factors. 228 Having assessed the conflict, the result is then
balanced against the weight of the effect on American commerce. 229 From
this analysis, the court then determines whether American contacts and
interests are sufficient to support the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 230
E.

The Fourth Circuit

The Fourth Circuit is a relative newcomer to the fraternity of districts
that have addressed the Act's extraterritorial reach. Nintendo of America v.
Aeropower Co. is the most recent case to address this issue. 3 Plaintiff
Nintendo is an American corporation that markets video games under the
registered American trademark "Nintendo. 232
Nintendo alleged that
defendant Aeropower, a Taiwanese corporation, manufactured and distributed
video games that infringed Nintendo's trademark. 233 The district court
enjoined Aeropower by prohibiting their infringing activity in the United
States, Canada and Mexico. 234 Aeropower appealed challenging the
extraterritorial reach of the injunctive decree.235
In its analysis, the Nintendo court cited cases from both the Second and
Ninth Circuits before basing its reasoning on the tripartite test of the Second
Circuit. 36 The court adopted the Second circuit's position, requiring a
significant effect on American commerce.237 In addition, the court noted
that the absence of two of the tripartite factors was fatal to a finding of the

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 614.
Id. at 613, 614.
Id. at 613.
Id.
Id. at 614-15.
34 F.3d 246, 248 (4th Cir. 1994).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 250-51.
Id.
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238

Act's foreign applicability.
However; the Fourth Circuit also referred to the need to consider
"additional proofs" concerning the possibility of conflicting laws between
America and foreign countries. 231 While itt referred to a balancing process,
the court did not clarify what exactly was to be balanced. It only noted that
the object of the balancing was to determine whether the contact and interests
of the United States were sufficient to support the exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction.240 The Nintendo court concluded by remanding for reconsideration the portions of the district court's injunctive decree that concerned the
extraterritorial conduct of Aeropower.241
IV.

COMPARISON AND CONTRAST OF THE EXTRATERRITORIAL TESTS

The Fourth and Fifth Circuits have attempted to unify the reasoning of
the Second Circuit with that of the Ninth, in their interpretation of the
extraterritorial reach of the Act. While their efforts are laudable, the issue
has not nearly been put to rest. This point is illustrated by comparing the
tripartite and Timberlane tests.
The first element of the tripartite test is that the defendant's conduct
must affect American commerce.2 42 The Second243 and Fourth244 Circuits require a substantial effect while the Fifth245 and Ninth 246 Circuits
merely require there to be some effect. -The Ninth Circuit deals with the
element of effect by asking first if there is any effect on American commerce
and then by considering its degree.247 The degree is then balanced against
248
considerations of comity.
This is similar to the approach of the Fifth Circuit in which the elements
of the tripartite test are also balanced against each other.249
The
implication of balancing the tripartite elements is that a lesser effect on
commerce may be offset by a lower degree of conflict with foreign trademark
law. This illustrates the essence of the difference in the application of the
tripartite test by the Second Circuit.
The Second Circuit does not really balance the elements of the test.

238. Id. at 251.
239. Id.
240. Id.

241.
242.
243.
244.

Id. at 251-52.
See supra text accompanying note 57.
See discussion supra part III.B.
See discussion supra part III.E.

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

See discussion
See discussion
See discussion
See discussion
See discussion

supra part
supra part
supra part
supra part
supra part

III.C.
II1.D.1. and 2.
III.D.2.
III.D.2.
III.C.
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Instead it simply notes that the absence of two of the factors is certainly fatal
while the absence of one may be fatal.250 The use of the word "may"
implies that in order for the absence of one element to be fatal, it must be of
such degree that it overcomes the presence of the other two. Although, this
may indicate a form of balancing, no second circuit decision has applied the
Act extraterritorially based on the strength of only one tripartite element.
Furthermore, a true balancing concept would also find the opposite result
when the presence of one element is so strong that it outweighs the absence
of the others. There is no such discussion coming from the Second Circuit.
Consequently, the Second Circuit's extraterritorial analysis is somewhat
mechanical. 25'
By contrast, the Ninth Circuit is much more flexible. It balances the
seven factors of comity against each other. The result is then compared to
the effect of the defendant's conduct on American commerce.2 52 The
concept of balancing creates elasticity. It allows subjectivity to enter the
analysis. Along with subjectivity comes considerations of justice and
fairness. It is not a matter of whether a particular extraterritorial element is
satisfied. The question is merely to what degree is it satisfied. The greater
the degree, the more weight it carries in the extraterritorial analysis.
Furthermore, the elements available for consideration are not static. They are
dynamic in that an element may be much more relevant in one case than
another. As a result, this provides a court with substantial latitude in
determining whether Congress intended the Act to apply to a certain factual
situation.
The Fourth and Fifth Circuits are really hybrids as they primarily utilize
the tripartite elements while vaguely referring to consideration of other
additional elements as being acceptable.253 The Fifth Circuit's balancing
concept is based on that of the Ninth.254 However, the Fourth Circuit cites
to the Second Circuit as support for its balancing terminology, which implies
that the concept is very limited if not non-existent. 2 "
The Fourth and Fifth Circuits do not have the advantage of numerous
opportunities in which to demonstrate the application of their reasoning. 6
As a result, their decisions continue to leave the door open to much
speculation and different interpretations. Unfortunately, because of their

250. See discussion supra part III.B.I and 5.
251. But see discussion supra part III.B.6. where the southern district of New York, within
the second circuit, employs a more flexible approach.
252. See discussion supra part II.D.1. and 2.
253. See discussion supra part III.C. and E.
254. See Rice, 701 F.2d at 414 n.8.
255. See Nintendo, 34 F.3d'at 251.

256. Most Lanham Act cases involving extraterritorial jurisdiction come from either the

East or West Coasts because of their proximity to foreign markets.
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geographic locations, it is not likely that clarification of their positions will
be forthcoming in the near future from either circuit. Consequently, until the
Supreme Court chooses to revisit the issue, any concerted effort at unification
of the Second and Ninth Circuits reasoning on this issue is left to legal
scholars.
V.

CONCLUSION: RECONCILIATION OF THE EXTRATERRITORIAL TESTS

This discussion has come full circle, leading back to the question of what
the legislature meant by the phrase "all commerce within the control of
Congress."2'57 The strength of the Second Circuit's interpretation is that its
mechanical application of the tripartite test leads to predictable results.
However, this may result in inequitable decisions in certain factual situations.
By contrast, the flexible approach of the Ninth Circuit sacrifices predictability
in order to lessen the risk of inequity. As a result, a model is called for to
unify the advantages of each approach and predict the path of the law in the
future.
The two main points of contention between the two circuits are first, the
balancing of the various factors and elements and second, which factors to
include in the balancing. Balancing offers flexibility which is essential in the
global economy of the world today. All of the districts refer to balancing.
The reasoning of the Ninth Circuit is the most developed on this issue.258
Therefore, the model should include the balancing approach as employed by
the Ninth Circuit.
However, any debate concerning which factors and elements to consider
in the process is merely superficial. Both the Second and Ninth Circuits
address the effect of the defendant's conduct on American commerce as well
as the potential conflict of laws with foreign countries. The seven
Timberlane factors are only used to resolve the question of conflict.259
Furthermore, the citizenship element of the tripartite test is subsumed in the
question of conflict in the Ninth Circuit.2" Therefore, the ultimate questions are the same and both circuits agree that all three tripartite factors are
relevant in reaching the jurisdictional conclusion.26'
The main difference is that the Ninth Circuit enumerates factors to be
considered in resolving the question of conflict where the Second Circuit
does not.262 Enumeration provides a basis for consistent application of
reasoning in determining the issue of conflicting laws. Thus, the model

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

15 U.S.C. § 1127.
See discussion supra part III.D.2. and part IV.
See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613.
See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
See Wells Fargo, 556 F.2d at 428.
See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
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should employ the Timberlane factors for the purpose of evaluating the
potential degree of conflict if the Act is applied extraterritorially.
Another difference to be resolved regarding the elements is the required
degree of effect on American commerce. The districts are split between
requiring a substantial 63 effect and some 26' effect. The difference is that
when effect is balanced against conflict, the degree of effect is important.
Since it was determined above that the model should employ the balancing
approach of the Ninth Circuit, substantiality is subsumed by the balancing
process. Consequently, substantiality may not be necessary in all cases.
Finally, the Second Circuit's concept of citizenship must give way to the
broader definition as employed by the other circuits as well as its own district
265
courts.
In this age of multi-national corporations and international
communications, a defendant's American presence may be substantial without
the defendant being a natural citizen. As a result, the model should define
citizenship by evaluating the degree of presence a defendant has in the
United States. A set of factors could be developed based on existing
precedent to aide in this determination.
In conclusion, a resolution is needed on this issue. Two different
standards are being used. This encourages corporations to shop for favorable
jurisdiction and leads to inefficiency both in the market and in the courts.
The answer does not lie in amended legislation because the world economy
is changing too rapidly. What may be a workable definition of commerce
within the control of Congress today may be obsolete by the turn of the
century. Therefore, the issue is left for the judicial system.
Hopefully, a
resolution will come soon in a Supreme Court decision adopting a model
with similar characteristics to the one proposed.

263. See discussion supra part III.B. and E.

264. See discussion supra part III.C. and D.I. and 2.
265. See discussion supra part II.B.3. and 4.
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